




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**

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National Intelligence Daily

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**Thursday
26 March 1987**



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
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ARGENTINA:**Army Human Rights Trials Begin**

Military unrest is growing in Argentina as trials of Army officers for human rights abuses begin this week. [redacted]

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About 120 active duty personnel—many more than anticipated by the government—are being summoned to testify. [redacted]

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~~some Army officers are planning "passive resistance measures," such as reporting to the barracks rather than to the courts when summoned. They reportedly believe that, if officers refuse to testify, the Army will be in a stronger position to bargain for an end to the trials. The Army is also attempting to have civilian courts declared incompetent to hear some cases.~~ [redacted]

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~~The US Embassy reports a bomb was discovered and defused outside the residence of a federal judge who is heavily involved in the trials. Last week a bomb exploded in the home of a criminal lawyer, killing his wife. Although responsibility has not been determined,~~ [redacted] ^{report} ~~the incident is part of an effort by the military to intimidate the judiciary. Antigovernment pamphlet bombs have been exploded at both Army and Navy headquarters during the past month.~~ [redacted]

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Comment: The large number of cases could prolong the trials well into 1989, and fears of enduring years of prosecution are prompting officers to challenge the government to resolve the issue quickly. Acts of disobedience and violence will probably increase over the next several weeks if the courts insist on pressing for indictments of active duty personnel. [redacted]

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President Alfonsin, who has so far successfully managed tensions, will attempt to stave off a confrontation by stalling the trials by means of legal loopholes while he searches for a solution acceptable to all sides. He may also take advantage of the Pope's visit next month to persuade John Paul to call for reconciliation, thus setting the stage for a limited amnesty if the situation deteriorates further. [redacted]

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**El Salvador:
Composition and Political Spectrum of the National Assembly**


Center moderate	Center right	Extreme right
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) 33 votes	National Conciliation Party (PCN) 12 votes	National Republican Alliance (ARENA) 13 votes
	Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party (PAISA) 1 vote	
	Independent 1 vote	



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EL SALVADOR:**Parties Agree To End Boycott**

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G/S*

A conservative opposition party has apparently cut a deal with El Salvador's ruling Christian Democrats to end the 11-week-old legislative boycott that has stalled state-of-emergency legislation and raised tensions in the military. [redacted] 25X1

reportedly

~~The National Conciliation Party has agreed in principle to vote with the Christian Democrats, giving the government a three-fourths legislative majority. In return, the conservative party will receive several subcabinet positions and a one-time cash payment.~~ [redacted] 25X1

[redacted]

The added votes will enable the Duarte administration to pass crucial legislation—including a renewal of the state of emergency, which requires a two-thirds vote—that has been stalled since the rightwing parties began their boycott in early January. ~~The US Embassy reports~~ that the police, who in the absence of emergency powers can hold prisoners without charge for only three days, have stopped arresting suspected subversives. The military has been concerned that the legislative impasse has allowed terrorists to move into the capital, increasing prospects for terrorism. [redacted] 25X1

Comment: The agreement effectively breaks the solid conservative voting bloc in the Assembly. If the new alliance holds, the right wing will be unable to stall legislation. [redacted] 25X1

The National Conciliation Party joined the boycott to protest the Christian Democrats' railroading of a controversial electoral reform bill. The party's leaders probably calculated that playing a constructive role in ending the boycott would revive their waning political fortunes before the election next year. [redacted] 25X1

The accord will ease the concerns of the armed forces, which have looked on the boycott as an example of politicians' putting their parochial concerns ahead of the national interest. [redacted] 25X1

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IRAN-US: Response to US Warnings

NO Iranian Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani's public response to the US demarche about Iranian use of its Silkworm antiship missiles suggests Tehran recognizes the seriousness of the US warning. In an interview Tuesday Rafsanjani said the warnings were an attempt to divert attention from US domestic problems arising out of US secret contacts with Iran. He said the initiative demonstrates that Tehran is more important to Washington than are the Arab states and that the US is an unreliable ally. According to Rafsanjani, the way Persian Gulf states can ensure their security is not to invite the US into the Gulf but to stop supporting Iraq. He also implied US military strikes against Iran could result in terrorists acts against US interests throughout the world.

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Comment: Iranian leaders have repeatedly exploited the revelations of US contacts with Iran to try to weaken Gulf states' support for Iraq and to undermine US influence in the region. Rafsanjani's remarks are intended to remind the Gulf states that cooperating with Washington may draw them more directly into the war with Iraq.

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NORTH KOREA-US: P'yongyang Proposes Talks

NO P'yongyang on Monday officially welcomed US guidelines permitting conversations with North Korean diplomats but sidestepped the US preconditions for moving beyond limited contacts—resuming the dialogue with South Korea and assuring a trouble-free Olympics in Seoul. The North suggested that the two sides meet in May in Beijing and pressed the US to urge South Korea to accept the North's latest proposals for dialogue and for cohosting the Olympics. Earlier this month a North Korean official said P'yongyang hopes the new guidelines will lead to a series of secret talks with the US similar to those that developed between the US and China in the early 1970s, [redacted] He said P'yongyang had already designated a representative for such talks. [redacted]

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
Comment: The North's reiteration of its interest in talks with the US underscores the priority P'yongyang attaches to opening direct contacts. P'yongyang is unlikely to give assurances on the US preconditions while negotiations on cohosting the Games and its jousting with Seoul over North-South talks continue. [redacted]

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25X1**WARSAW PACT: Foreign Ministers' Meeting**

on 25 March
 NO

The meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Moscow ended yesterday, endorsing, as expected, recent Soviet arms control initiatives ~~such as the delinking of INF negotiations from the Reykjavik package~~. The communique welcomed the Soviet pledge to withdraw SS-12 SRBMs stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia as soon as an INF agreement is signed. It reiterated Soviet readiness to begin talks "right away" on reducing or eliminating other unspecified shorter range missiles. The ministers reaffirmed the East's proposals at the CSCE Review Conference in Vienna, supporting in particular parallel all-European negotiations on conventional disarmament and on further measures to build confidence and security within the CSCE framework. In a separate statement, they called for agreement this year on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

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Comment: Although the communique did not claim full agreement among the participants, the talks were presumably less acrimonious than the session last October in Bucharest, at which Romanian President Ceausescu publicly upbraided the Soviets for linking INF negotiations to agreement on defense and space weapons. General Secretary Gorbachev used this meeting to stress once again the importance of multilateral consultations and coordinated actions as well as the need for dynamism and flexibility in foreign policy.

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
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VIETNAM-CAMBODIA-CHINA: New Settlement Plan

Said recently
 Vietnamese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach ~~told~~ Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar ~~last week~~ that Hanoi wishes to reach an early settlement of the Cambodian conflict through negotiations restricted to Southeast Asian parties. ~~Mochtar told US officials that~~ Hanoi is now emphasizing a settlement among the four Cambodian parties and endorsed by Vietnam and ASEAN, instead of one reached as part of a normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. The new approach envisions normalization with China, but later than, and not directly tied to, a Cambodian settlement.

Comment: Hanoi's plan—apparently an attempt to play on regional suspicions of Beijing—would circumvent China's demand that Vietnam withdraw its forces from Cambodia prior to negotiations or normalization talks, and, if successful, would present Beijing with a settlement over which it had little influence. Although Mochtar sees encouraging signs in Hanoi's overture, Thai and Singaporean wariness, along with China's guaranteed strong opposition, will prevent any early breakthrough.

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INDIA: Congress Party Setbacks in State Elections

No
 The Indian Congress Party's losses Monday to Marxist-led coalitions in West Bengal and Kerala state elections are not critical setbacks for Prime Minister Gandhi. Press reports suggest, however, that the party now may try to delay the election later this year in Haryana, part of the party's northern base, by extending the legislative assembly there beyond its closing, scheduled for 23 June. The Congress Party and its Muslim-dominated coalition partner won handily in a third election Monday in Jammu and Kashmir.

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Comment: The Congress Party's strong showing in Hindu-majority areas of Jammu and Kashmir suggests Hindu voters in neighboring Haryana will still support the party despite Gandhi's inability to eliminate Sikh extremism in Punjab. He campaigned heavily in all three states and is likely to face increased press and party criticism in the wake of the defeats, which come in the midst of press and parliamentary questioning of his leadership. Critics will also trumpet the Kerala loss as an embarrassment for Gandhi, whose party no longer governs any of India's four southern states.

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In Brief**USSR***G/S**No**CW* 25X1

on 25 March
 — *Pravda* ~~yesterday~~ published speech by **Soviet** Politburo member Solomentsev containing favorable mention of plans for CPSU conference . . . first such reference since Gorbachev's report to plenum . . . indicates support within Politburo.

*G/S**CW*

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South Asia*G/S**reportedly*

— Proresistance press in **Pakistan** claims jets from **Afghanistan** bombed border villages in Pakistan, **Iran**, and Afghanistan . . . ~~asserts~~ 80 killed, 60 wounded . . . such attacks directed at resistance's support areas.

CW

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*No**CW* 25X1**East Asia***No*

— [redacted] noted marked increase in **Chinese** troops in past month . . . probably from elsewhere in Tibet . . . may be gathering for move to **Indian** border.

CW 25X1

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G/S

on 25 March
 — Former **Chinese** Communist Party head Hu Yaobang criticized at National People's Congress ~~yesterday~~ . . . Beijing touting Hu's first appearance since ouster as proof of normalcy . . . official media emphasis on unified leadership masks political infighting.

CW

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Americas*G/S*

— Anibal Teixeira, former adviser to **Brazilian** President, named Planning Minister . . . appointment of noneconomist signals reduced role for Ministry, once a counterweight to Finance Ministry's hardline debt policies.

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Special Analysis**LIBYA-CHAD-
SUDAN:****Qadhafi's Campaign Collapsing**

CW

The withdrawal of Libyan forces from northern Chad to the Aozou Strip now appears inevitable, although this may not yet be clear to Tripoli. With the rout of the Libyan garrison at Ouadi Doum and the subsequent abandonment of Faya-Largeau, Tripoli will be unable to hold territory outside the Tibesti mountains. The magnitude of the Chad debacle will almost certainly spark coup plotting within the defeated Libyan military, although it may take time for such plots to develop.

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The smaller garrisons in the Tibesti region are all that remains of the Libyan hold on northern Chad. These too will be untenable once Chadian Government forces shift the focus of their offensive to the area. The Libyans, unable to subdue some 3,000 progovernment Chadians in the Tibesti area over the past three months, will be unlikely to hold their ground once several thousand additional Chadian Government troops push into the mountains.

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Libya's senior commander in Chad still hopes to reverse the situation, but he has only a slim chance of gaining even a propaganda victory. His forces in Chad outside of the Tibesti area are battered and demoralized and probably cannot be mustered into an effective fighting force.

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Libyan losses at Ouadi Doum remain unconfirmed, but they may be on the order of 1,700 killed, wounded, and captured. N'Djamena has publicly claimed 1,269 Libyans dead in the Ouadi Doum area; even this number is plausible. The overall toll of Libyans killed, wounded, and captured in the past four months would then be between 3,000 and 4,000.

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Territorial Violations Concern Sudanese

Sudanese leaders are worried about the spillover of Chadian-Libyan fighting into western Sudan, but the Sudanese military is still waiting for clear directions from political leaders on how to respond. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] is convinced it will have to step in against the Libyan forces in the west to resolve the threat to Sudan's security. The Sudanese believe that some 400 to 500 Chadian soldiers crossed into Sudan on Tuesday in pursuit of a similar-size Libyan force; the Army wants to avoid getting involved in a battle between the two. The Army is also trying to secure Al Junaynah airfield because it is concerned that the Libyans might try to seize it.

The Sudanese military, with limited capabilities, is reluctant to become involved, and may hope that, by the time it can move more forces to the west, Chadian forces will have defeated the disorganized Libyans and returned to Chad. The military is irate because the government's weak diplomatic stand against foreign use of Sudanese territory may make a military confrontation inevitable.

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Implications for Domestic Stability

Qadhafi will be unable to hide the extent of Libya's defeat in Chad from the Libyan people. Libyan broadcasts to domestic audiences are emphatically denying Western reports of Libyan defeats, which suggests that Libyans are turning to Western stations for news, as they did after the US airstrike last year.

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Libya's humiliation in Chad will almost certainly prompt plotting by disgruntled military elements to remove Qadhafi.

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Qadhafi is viewed in Libyan military circles as personally responsible for the involvement in Chad. Military personnel, including senior officers, have long opposed Qadhafi's Chad campaign.

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Opposition to the Chad campaign by virtually all elements of the Libyan population will aggravate a political climate already conducive to coup plotting. If plotting is already under way, the defeat at Ouadi Doum may trigger a coup attempt soon by officers attempting to capitalize immediately on Qadhafi's humiliation. If plotting is not yet in train, the Chad debacle probably will generate it.

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Civilian opposition to Qadhafi—until recently divided and unorganized—will probably begin to coalesce as a result of Libya's defeat in Chad. The killing of a senior official in Benghazi last August by a group of dissidents, including several military personnel, who were recently hanged, indicates that some organized opposition existed last year.

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The chance of a plot succeeding will depend on the ability of discontented elements to penetrate Qadhafi's pervasive security system. Qadhafi's praetorian guard—the best trained and equipped unit in Libya—has stood firmly behind him in his worst crises, probably because Qadhafi has always ensured that it remained insulated from the consequences of his domestic and foreign policies.

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A key unknown now is the impact of the defeat in Chad on the attitudes of Qadhafi's key security force commanders. Qadhafi's humiliation in Chad might result in his removal by some of these commanders or by them and elements of the regular military.

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Another view holds that:

DIA Comment: Libyan setbacks in Chad have been serious and for the most part the entire region outside the Tibesti is nearly indefensible, but Qadhafi is unlikely to give up all but the Aozou Strip. The terrain in the mountains favors the defenders, be they Libyan or

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Chadian, and to date in this region neither side has been able to inflict serious losses on the other. For the foreseeable future Libya will continue to garrison troops in the Tibesti.

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While the defeat in Ouadi Doum and the conduct of the Chad war in general have increased dissent within the military, it is the war in Chad that has had a unifying effect on the dissident military. Following a withdrawal of the majority of troops in Chad and a decrease in combat operations and resulting casualties, one of the prime causes of the opposition will be resolved, and a major unifying factor will no longer exist.

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While coup plots could be spawned, traditionally Qadhafi's pervasive security apparatus has been unusually effective in detecting and preempting any actions. The security apparatus is no less effective now than in the past; therefore, it could likely continue to be effective in stopping opposition.

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To cite the recent public execution of individuals implicated in the August killing of Revolutionary Committee member Warfalla as a coalescence of opposition as a result of Chad is improper. This killing took place long before vast numbers of troops were deployed to Chad and long before any defeat at Fada or Ouadi Doum. In fact this killing was apparently primarily a personal grudge. The prime conspirator was previously arrested by Warfalla and tortured during his imprisonment. He vowed to get even and procured the assistance of others. This act was one of personal revenge against Warfalla and was not necessarily directed at the regime. There is certainly no cause-and-effect relationship between this act and the war in Chad.

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Qadhafi is certainly less popular than he has been in the past, and his policy in Chad has contributed to his decline in popularity, but Chad is not the sole cause of the discontent. The decline in oil revenues, government austerity measures, and declining personal revenues have had major impacts as well. Possibly these economic factors have impacted even more heavily on the individual Libyan civilian as well as the Libyan military; yet there has not been to date a flurry of coup attempts. The key to Qadhafi's survival lies with his security forces. When they become disaffected or their effectiveness declines for whatever reason, then the regime will be threatened.

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Key Internal Democratic Opposition Parties in Nicaragua *

Party	Comments
Social Christian Party (PSC)	Most prominent internal opposition group. Rocked by divisions. Party presidency claimed by two contenders. Catholic Church may mediate dispute.
Democratic Conservative Party of Nicaragua (PCDN)	Was largest opposition party under former dictator Somoza. Split into at least five factions. Several work with the regime and are represented in the Sandinista-dominated National Assembly.
Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC)	Weakest opposition party. [redacted] has agreed to cooperate with antiregime faction of Democratic Conservative Party.
Social Democratic Party (PSD)	US Embassy says party beginning to deteriorate. Former leader recently went into exile. Has little support outside Managua.
Liberal Party (PALI)	Created last year by former head of private-sector organization. Trying to gain allies among factions of Social Christian Party.
Independent Liberal Party (PLI)	Participated in election in 1984; holds nine seats in National Assembly. Leadership increasingly critical of Sandinistas but includes accommodationist faction. US Embassy says Sandinistas trying to split party.
Popular Social Christian Party (PPSC)	Broadly supportive of regime in the past. Party leader may be taking more independent stance.

* The internal opposition parties have no links to the Contras. Some members of the internal parties who are in exile, however, have contact with the Contras.

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Special Analysis

NICARAGUA:

Internal Opposition Politics

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Leaders of the internal Nicaraguan opposition are planning to increase their activities. Their potential to challenge the regime remains limited, however, because of internal divisions and effective Sandinista countermeasures. Because the government is probably concerned that the decline in its popularity might lead to more unrest, it is likely to continue to restrict the opposition's maneuvering room. *CW*

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reportedly

The internal opposition parties *reportedly* are convinced that the country's mounting economic woes are creating a climate of discontent that works to their benefit. ~~According to US Embassy reports~~. Several spontaneous outbursts of antigovernment unrest have taken place over the past six months. ~~US Embassy officials report~~ there may be a strike by market vendors in Managua.

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The opposition has become more active since the beginning of the year. The main opposition coalition, the Democratic Coordinating Board, sponsored three unauthorized rallies in mid-January to dramatize the shortcomings of Nicaragua's new constitution. Early this month, the Board and another group held small anti-Sandinista rallies in Managua; both were broken up by police.

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The Opposition's Vulnerabilities

Factional infighting reduces the opposition's ability to generate popular support. Sharp splits in the Social Christian Party, highly publicized by the Sandinista-controlled media, are damaging the party's domestic and international image and possibly its grassroots organizational efforts. ~~According to US Embassy reports~~. Rural members of the party are frequently uninformed about its goals and are loyal to local rather than national leaders. ~~According to US officials~~

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Cooperation among opposition groups is also limited. One member party boycotted a recent rally organized by the Democratic Coordinating Board and held a separate one instead. Some opposition leaders even remain willing to try to work out an accommodation with the regime

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Sandinista Countermeasures

Managua allows the opposition little room to build or maintain popular support. The new constitution empowers the regime to decide which political parties may organize legally. The Sandinistas hold an absolute monopoly on the media. [REDACTED]

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The security forces intimidate the opposition. At least 10 opposition leaders have been arrested so far this year, and some have been beaten while in detention, according to US Embassy reports. [REDACTED]

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In rural areas, where anti-Sandinista sentiment is highest, resettlement programs and security sweeps have reduced the opposition's chances of capitalizing on discontent. The government's moves over the past year to increase land distribution to peasants in war zones have a similar goal. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Opposition leaders will probably push ahead with plans for more demonstrations. They see the meeting of the International Parliamentary Union in Managua next month as an opportunity to stage rallies with reduced risk of a Sandinista reaction and to expand their international contacts. [REDACTED]

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To improve their stature, opposition leaders may accept the public offer of Arturo Cruz—a former member of the Contra directorate—to return to Nicaragua. Cruz's return—in the unlikely event that the Sandinistas permit it—would be a temporary gain for the opposition, but over the long run his presence might intensify their divisions. [REDACTED]

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Managua is probably worried that more protests have the potential of sparking spontaneous outbursts of antigovernment sentiment. Any sign that the internal opposition is gaining momentum would prompt a quick reaction. Hardliners in the regime are likely to use the increase in opposition activity to strengthen their case for delaying municipal elections beyond this year. [REDACTED]


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Special Analysis**MOZAMBIQUE:****Additional Outside Support**

Mozambican President Chissano is moving on several fronts to gain more foreign assistance, to strengthen ties to neighboring black African states, and to ease tensions with South Africa. Although several of his initiatives appear to be paying dividends, they are unlikely to alter decisively the war against RENAMO guerrillas or to reverse Mozambique's economic decline.

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NO

Since coming to power in November, Chissano has sought aid from a wide variety of sources. Although the USSR, Maputo's single most important aid donor, has pledged only modest new assistance, a high-level Soviet economic delegation visited Mozambique this month to underscore close ties; the two countries are observing the 10th anniversary of their Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation this month. The Soviets have provided about \$1.8 billion in military and \$300 million in economic aid since Mozambique's independence in 1975, and some 800 Soviet—as well as 800 Cuban and several hundred East European—military advisers are supporting government counterinsurgency operations.

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At the same time, Chissano has sought additional aid from Western sources. Traditional donors, including Italy and the Nordic countries, appear prepared to augment modestly their development assistance, according to US Embassy reports. The UK has agreed to double its small military training effort and expand economic aid, largely earmarked for transport projects, according to the Embassy. Chissano reportedly will make a state visit to London and other West European capitals in early May.

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Regional Support

Chissano also has won pledges of greater help from his fellow Frontline States. Some 5,000 to 6,000 Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique—most deployed along the Beira transportation corridor—have extended their operations to the north-central region and assumed a greater burden of the fighting. Zimbabwean forces in Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia Provinces have retaken virtually all the major towns that fell to RENAMO last year.

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Tanzania deployed 1,200 to 1,600 troops to Quelimane earlier this year, and they are engaging in both defensive and offensive operations, according to the Embassy. [REDACTED]

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Chissano also has improved Mozambique's traditionally poor relations with Malawi. The Banda government in recent months has agreed to deploy troops along a key rail line that links Malawi to the Indian Ocean. The two countries also have opened discussions about the 138,000 Mozambican refugees in Malawi. [REDACTED]

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In part to discourage greater South African support for RENAMO, Chissano generally has pursued conciliatory policies toward Pretoria. Earlier this year, he expelled six ANC members at Pretoria's insistence and has told his Frontline colleagues that Mozambique will not impose economic sanctions against South Africa. South African officials have described relations with Maputo as "looking up" and have agreed to help finance improvements for the port of Maputo, according to the Embassy. Earlier this year, Pretoria partially reversed a decision not to renew contracts for 62,000 Mozambicans working in South African mines. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Chissano will continue to look to both East and West for economic and military aid. He will pursue initiatives to expand ties to the West cautiously, however, to avoid alarming Moscow and pro-Soviet officials in his government. [REDACTED]

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Zimbabwe and Tanzania probably will maintain their military commitment to Mozambique despite rising costs, higher casualties, and domestic opposition. Harare appears convinced, for example, that its involvement—particularly its defense of key transport arteries through Mozambique—is essential to its own economic and security interests. Nevertheless, neither Harare nor Dar es Salaam is likely to increase its commitment enough to have a decisive effect on the outcome of the war. [REDACTED]

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Chissano will be unable to stem economic deterioration until the security situation improves. To accomplish this, he will have to improve the dismal performance of his 35,000-man military which, despite substantial external assistance, has yet to demonstrate it can contain RENAMO. [REDACTED]

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